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ARRANGMENTS THAT TIE DOWN THE
EQUITABLE SCALES
Brett Aaron Mangrum*
N Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit recently rejected the argument that the use of a
pure monopoly to tie the purchase of patented seeds to the sale of a
particular herbicide constituted patent misuse. In affirming summary
judgment rulings in favor of plaintiff patentee, the Federal Circuit inade-
quately addressed equitable doctrines, previously emphasized by the Su-
preme Court and the Federal Circuit itself, that are intended to prevent a
patentee from impermissibly extending the scope or term of a patent be-
yond its statutory grant.2 Additionally, the outcome of the Monsanto de-
cision undermined the rationale of the patent system by encouraging
licensing techniques that potentially inhibit rather than "promote the Pro-
gress of ... the useful Arts" through innovation.3
Monsanto Co. ("Monsanto") owned patents related to the genetic
treatment of plants resistant to insects and glyphosate herbicides. 4 Mon-
santo used these patents to commercially develop soybeans and cotton
resistant to glyphosate herbicides, known as Roundup Ready ® soybeans
and cotton.5 According to the facts alleged by several defendant farmers
(collectively "Scruggs"), Monsanto's effective market share of the herbi-
cide tolerant trait soybean and cotton markets had long exceeded ninety
percent.6 Monsanto also sold Roundup, one of the glyphosate herbicides
to which the Roundup Ready® plants were resistant. 7 In 1996 Monsanto
began licensing its biotechnology with several restrictions, including pro-
* J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
2. See, e.g., 11. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1286 (2006) (citing
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) and Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917); see also Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seif-
fhart, 803 F.2d 661, 664-65 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (using a simple three-step test for illegal tying).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
4. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1332.
5. Id. at 1133.
6. See Brief of Appellants Non-Confidential at 38-39, Monsanto, 459 F.3d 1328 (No.
04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121).
7. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1333.
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scribing the use of second-generation seeds produced by a licensed crop
("exclusivity provision").8 Of particular significance to the tying issue,
the licenses initiated between 1996 and 1998 further required growers to
apply only Roundup brand herbicide if using a glyphosate-based herbi-
cide ("Roundup restriction"). 9
Scruggs purchased Roundup Ready® soybean and cotton seeds from
seed companies without signing a licensing agreement. 10 Scruggs planted
the purchased seeds and later retained seeds obtained from the harvest
for subsequent plantings." Monsanto filed suit for patent infringement,
asserting Scruggs was not licensed to plant the harvested seeds. 12 Scruggs
denied infringement and sought a declaration of invalidity for the patents
at issue. 13 In addition, Scruggs answered with common law counter-
claims, federal and state antitrust claims, and patent misuse affirmative
defenses.14 Scruggs specifically claimed that Monsanto had tied the
purchase of patented seeds to the sale of Roundup herbicide through li-
cense restrictions, thereby misusing the relevant patents by illegally
broadening their scope with anticompetitive effect.' 5 Both Monsanto and
Scruggs filed motions for summary judgment.' 6
The district court granted Monsanto's motions for summary judgment
and issued a permanent injunction against Scruggs from further sale and
use of seeds containing Monsanto's patented biotechnology. 17 On ap-
peal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgments in favor of
Monsanto, finding found that Scruggs had not obtained any legally cogni-
zable license to use Monosanto's patented biotechnology.' 8 The Federal
Circuit also rejected Scrugg's affirmative defenses, including the alleged
illegal tying.19 However, the Federal Circuit vacated the permanent in-
junction as improperly granted and remanded the case on the issue of the
injunction alone.20
In the context of tying arrangements, patent misuse is an equitable de-
fense to infringement that proscribes using market power associated with
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1339.





15. Id. at 1333, 1340-41.
16. Id. at 1333.
17. See id. at 1133-34.
18. See id. at 1342.
19. Id. at 1340-41. The Federal Circuit also failed to address the fact that Monsanto's
patents covered only genes while the alleged unlawful tying required purchase of seeds
with the genes. See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in
Support of Defendants-Appellants Supporting Reversal on Certain Issues at 20, Monsanto,
459 F.3d 1328 (Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121).
20. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1342 (holding that the district improperly applied the four
part test for permanent injunctions in patent cases, as recently described in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (U.S. 2006)).
[Vol. 60
Casenote
patent rights21 impermissibly to broaden the "physical or temporal
scope" of the patent grant. 22 A successful patent misuse defense results
in rendering the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged.23 In
Monsanto, the Federal Circuit rejected Scruggs's trying arguments be-
cause Scruggs failed to show the Roundup restriction had an adverse ef-
fect on competition. 24 The majority essentially held that the Roundup
restriction requiring Roundup Ready® seed growers to apply only
Roundup brand herbicide if using glyphosate merely enforced then-ex-
isting EPA regulations. 25 The district court concluded, and the Federal
Circuit agreed, that the tie had no anticompetitive effect because
Roundup was the only EPA-approved glyphosate herbicide that could be
used between 1996 and 1998.26 Not only is this conclusion questionable,
but its shaky foundation rides the controversial winds of doctrine intro-
duced by the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF,
Inc.27
In Windsurfing, the Federal Circuit pulled out of thin air the additional
"anticompetitive effect" requirement for a finding of patent misuse.28
The Supreme Court has never required proof of an anticompetitive effect
in the tied product for a finding of patent misuse and indeed, it has un-
equivocally explained that even if "control of the unpatented article or
device falls short of a prohibited restraint of trade or monopoly, it will
not be sanctioned. '29 Other Federal Appellate courts have appropriately
followed this directive.30 Even the Federal Circuit itself back-paddled
from Windsurfing within nine months of its decision by affirming a patent
misuse analysis that did not require proof of an anticompetitive effect. 31
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000); see also infra note 34.
22. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971); see also
B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Wind-
surfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
23. Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
24. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1340-41.
25. See id. at 1341.
26. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 577 (N.D. Miss. 2004); see also
Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1339-1341.
27. See Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1339 (quoting the "anticompetitive effect" requirement
from Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Windsurf-
ing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (inserting, without citing any
authority, "with anticompetitive effect" into the Supreme Court's definition of patent mis-
use announced in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343
(1971)).
28. See Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 343.
29. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947)
(citing Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 496 (1946)).
30. See, e.g., Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir.
1964) (concluding "[in view of the history and policy of the defense of patent misuse we
find no merit in appellant's contentions that the proof of substantial lessening of competi-
tion is a prerequisite to finding patent misuse"); Columbus Auto. Corp. v. Oldberg Mfg.
Co., 264 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D. Colo. 1967), affd, 387 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1968) (affirming a
lower court assertion that "[a] showing of an actual monopoly [in the tied product] or a
tendency to create such in a line of commerce is not necessary").
31. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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In short, there is no present legal basis for an "anticompetitive effects"
requirement in the patent misuse context.
It is curious that the Federal Circuit held in Monsanto that "patent mis-
use may be found even where there is no antitrust violation, because
'[p]atent misuse is ... a broader wrong than [an] antitrust violation."32
Under antitrust law, a tying arrangement is generally challengeable if:
"(1) the seller has market power in the tying product, (2) the arrange-
ment has an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market for the
tied product, and (3) efficiency justifications for the arrangement do not
outweigh the anticompetitive effects. '33 In the 1988 Patent Misuse Re-
form Act, Congress added the additional requirement of proof of market
power in the tying product for a patent misuse defense. 34 Congress re-
jected, however, a proposal to predicate a finding of patent misuse on a
violation of the antitrust laws. 35 The Federal Circuit's requirement of a
second antitrust element to prove patent misuse in Monsanto, therefore,
inappropriately subsumed the demarcation of illicit patent ties effectively
within antitrust law.36
Despite the ruling to the contrary in Monsanto,37 Scruggs alleged suffi-
cient evidence of patent misuse to survive summary judgment, even
under the inappropriate antitrust standards required by the Federal Cir-
cuit. In the context of antitrust law, the Supreme Court very recently
reaffirmed its stance on the danger of tying arrangements posed by own-
ers of patent monopolies. In Tool Works, the Court explained that any
effort to use the market power conferred by a patent monopoly to re-
strain competition in the market for the second or tied product "will un-
dermine competition on the merits in that second market. '38 Once
requisite market power is established, a "probability of anticompetitive
consequences" exists when a patent license contains a "condition that the
buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied product from the
patentee. '39
The facts alleged in Monsanto are sufficiently analogous to the Su-
preme Court's antitrust example in Tool Works to support a finding of
32. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1339 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d
1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
33. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 26 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (emphasis added); see also I11. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink,
Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292-1293 (2006) (referring to the same guidelines).
34. In relevant part, the statute permits a defendant to raise this equitable bar to re-
covery for infringement only if "in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product." 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)
(2000). This additional requirement is analogous to the first element or step required for a
finding of an antitrust violation.
35. See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the
Tie?", 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 23-25 (1991) (giving a concise description of the 1988
Congressional debate).
36. See Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1339 (quoting C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1372).
37. Id. at 1342.
38. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1288.
39. See id. at 1287-88.
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illegal tying. First, Scruggs alleged through expert reports that Mon-
santo's market share of the herbicide tolerant trait soybean and cotton
markets had long exceeded ninety percent and that by 2005, for instance,
Monsanto's market share in Mississippi had reached ninety-six percent. 40
A pure monopoly is sufficient evidence of market power in the relevant
market and heightens concerns of illegal leverage.4 1 Second, the license
agreements initiated between 1996 and 1998 contained the following (or
similar) language: "You [the grower] agree: ... [i]f a herbicide containing
the same active ingredient as Roundup Ultra TM herbicide [glyphosate]
(or one with a similar mode of action) is used over the top of Roundup
Ready crops, you agree to use only Roundup® branded herbicide. '42
Third, Scruggs provided evidence that competing products existed during
the years between 1996 and 1998 and that they were lacking only regula-
tory approval. 43 In Monsanto, Justice Dyk correctly argued in his dissent
that the Roundup restrictions potentially discouraged competitors from
seeking regulatory approval or attempting to have the EPA regulation
modified or eliminated. 44 If some competitors eventually enter the mar-
ket, but others are discouraged, the patentee succeeds illegally in re-
straining competition.45 Moreover, Justice Dyk appropriately pointed
out that it is "highly significant" that the Roundup restrictions did not
simply require an EPA-approved herbicide; rather, they required
"Roundup branded herbicide" for all glyphosate use.46 A potential her-
bicide competitor thus would be concerned that, even if it secured EPA
approval, use of the approved herbicide is still contractually barred.47 At
a minimum, therefore, Scruggs raised fact issues suggesting that "the
overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlawfully. 48
The counter argument to these claims of anticompetitive practices is
that Monsanto "modified its contracts accordingly" after its competitors
obtained regulatory approval.49 This argument is misplaced. The fact
that Monsanto may have modified the contract language for other li-
40. Reply Brief of Appellants Non Confidential at 3-5, Monsanto, 459 F.3d 1328 (Nos.
04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121).
41. See IU. Tool Works Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1288; see also Brief of Appellants Non-Confi-
dential, supra note 6, at 41 (asserting that two-thirds of the market share is sufficient to
prove a monopoly).
42. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1342. Despite the Federal Circuit implications to the con-
trary, it is inapposite that licensees were not required to buy any herbicide at all. See N.
Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) ("For our purposes a tying arrange-
ment may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that
he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.").
43. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1343.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1344.
47. Id.
48. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis ad-
ded). The more recent Monsanto opinion relied heavily on the Monsanto Co. v. McFarling
opinion to emphasize the anticompetitive effect requirement for a patent misuse defense.
49. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1341.
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censes entered into subsequent to 1998 does not necessarily purge the
alleged anticompetitive effects of preexisting, unmodified contracts initi-
ated between 1996 and 1998, especially if those contract provisions are
still in force. As Scruggs noted, Monsanto sued to enforce the Roundup
restriction against licensees as recent as 2004, and such restrictions alleg-
edly "remain in effect until terminated. '50 The Roundup restriction is
purportedly still in force, therefore, at least six years after competitors had
achieved EPA approval for their glyphosate herbicide products, long af-
ter Monsanto's glyophosate patents had expired. A suit to enforce the
Roundup restriction this long after the patents' expiration not only serves
as evidence that Monsanto sought to force a licensee "to do something
that he would not do in a competitive market,151 it is also evidence that
Monsanto attempted to extend its expired patent rights beyond their
term. Such alleged actions fall squarely within the defined scope of pat-
ent misuse.5 2 Therefore, the Federal Circuit ruling that Scruggs "does not
point to sufficient evidence" is astonishing.53
Justice Dyk, in his dissent, further argued that enforcing federal law is
no justification for otherwise unlawful tying arrangements. 54 In consider-
ing a case involving collusion among competitors, the Supreme Court has
held the fact "that a particular practice may be unlawful is not, in itself, a
sufficient justification for collusion among competition to prevent it.''55
The majority in Monsanto countered that Monsanto had argued merely
that its contract provisions lacked anticompetitive effect, not that they
protected the public or furthered EPA policy. 56 The question of what
motivated the Roundup restrictions in the first place thus remains. If
Monsanto did not include the Roundup restrictions to further EPA pol-
icy, Scrugg's argument that the Roundup restrictions intentionally served
anticompetitive purposes appears correct.57
From a policy perspective, the Federal Circuit ruling risks undermining
the objective of the patent system by encouraging licensing techniques
that potentially hamper innovation. 58 Patent policy is not served by anti-
trust laws that focus entirely on a free market society by preventing un-
reasonable restraints of trade.59 Monsanto's actions, even when viewed
in the light most favorable to Scruggs, not only potentially restrain com-
petition, but also potentially discourage innovation in the field of glypho-
50. Brief of Appellants Non-Confidential, supra note 6, at 51; see also Complaint at 42,
47, Monsanto v. Bandy, No. 04CV00708ERW (E.D. Mo. June 8, 2004).
51. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281,1287 (2006) (citing Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-16 (1984)).
52. See Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1339.
53. Id. at 1340.
54. Id. at 1343 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Indep. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465
(1986)).
56. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1341.
57. See id. at 1339.
58. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
59. Joe Potenza et al., Patent Misuse-The Critical Balance, A Patent Lawyer's View,
15 Fed. Cir. B.J. 69, 88-89 (2005).
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sate research for fear of limited economic return. This is especially true
since Monsanto's glyphosate patents had expired years previously.60 The
Federal Circuit ruling, therefore, risks giving a carte blanche to patentees
who wish to advantageously exploit unusual settings to broaden the scope
of their patent or its term through tying arrangements. Both the free
market economy and innovation in the useful arts may ultimately suffer
as a result.
Although Scruggs' tying arguments may have proven insufficient at
trial,61 the Federal Circuit inappropriately precluded greater scrutiny of
the patent misuse allegations raised by Scruggs when it affirmed summary
judgment on the issue.62 The result is an unwarranted constriction of the
doctrine of patent misuse that not only conflicts with court precedent, but
also risks both antitrust and patent law policies underpinning prior deci-
sions. The Federal Circuit thus risks leaving budding innovators and free
market competitors potentially choked out by the towering shadows of
pure monopolist patentees.
60. Brief of Appellee Monsanto Company at 2, Monsanto, 459 F.3d 1328 (Nos. 04-
1532, 05-1120, 05-1121).
61. Monsanto v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 583 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
62. Monsanto, 452 F.3d at 1342.
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